231 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
231 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
# Adds TrustFence configuration
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#
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# To use it add the following line to conf/local.conf:
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#
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# INHERIT += "trustfence"
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#
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# Inheriting this class enables the following default TrustFence configuration:
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#
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# * Disabled console
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#
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# Default secure console configuration
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TRUSTFENCE_CONSOLE_DISABLE ?= "0"
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# Uncomment to enable the console with the specified passphrase
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#TRUSTFENCE_CONSOLE_PASSPHRASE_ENABLE = "my_secure_passphrase"
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# Alternatively, uncommment to enable the console with the specified GPIO
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#TRUSTFENCE_CONSOLE_GPIO_ENABLE = "4"
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# Default secure boot configuration
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TRUSTFENCE_SIGN ?= "1"
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TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH ?= "default"
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TRUSTFENCE_DEK_PATH ?= "default"
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TRUSTFENCE_DEK_PATH:ccmp1 ?= "0"
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TRUSTFENCE_ENCRYPT_ENVIRONMENT ?= "1"
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TRUSTFENCE_SRK_REVOKE_MASK ?= "0x0"
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TRUSTFENCE_KEY_INDEX ?= "0"
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# Partition encryption configuration
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TRUSTFENCE_ENCRYPT_PARTITIONS ?= "1"
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TRUSTFENCE_ENCRYPT_ROOTFS ?= "${@bb.utils.contains("IMAGE_FEATURES", "read-only-rootfs", "0", "1", d)}"
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# Read-only rootfs
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TRUSTFENCE_READ_ONLY_ROOTFS ?= "${@bb.utils.contains("IMAGE_FEATURES", "read-only-rootfs", "1", "0", d)}"
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#
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# NOTHING TO CUSTOMIZE BELOW THIS LINE
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#
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# TrustFence sign artifacts is not supported on all platforms
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TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_ARTIFACTS = "1"
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TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_ARTIFACTS:ccmp1 = "0"
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TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_ARTIFACTS:ccimx93 = "0"
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IMAGE_FEATURES += "dey-trustfence"
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# Function to generate a PKI tree (with lock dir protection)
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GENPKI_LOCK_DIR = "${TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH}/.genpki.lock"
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gen_pki_tree() {
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if mkdir -p ${GENPKI_LOCK_DIR}; then
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if [ "${DEY_SOC_VENDOR}" = "NXP" ]; then
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trustfence-gen-pki.sh ${TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH}
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elif [ "${DEY_SOC_VENDOR}" = "STM" ]; then
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export CONFIG_SIGN_KEYS_PATH="${TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH}"
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trustfence-gen-pki.sh -p ${DIGI_SOM}
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fi
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rm -rf ${GENPKI_LOCK_DIR}
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else
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bbfatal "Could not get lock to generate PKI tree"
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fi
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}
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# Function that generates a PKI tree if there isn't one
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check_gen_pki_tree() {
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if [ "${DEY_SOC_VENDOR}" = "NXP" ]; then
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SRK_KEYS="$(echo ${TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH}/crts/SRK*crt.pem | sed s/\ /\,/g)"
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n_commas="$(echo ${SRK_KEYS} | grep -o "," | wc -l)"
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if [ "${n_commas}" -eq 0 ]; then
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gen_pki_tree
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elif [ "${n_commas}" -ne 3 ]; then
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bbfatal "Inconsistent PKI tree"
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fi
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elif [ "${DEY_SOC_VENDOR}" = "STM" ]; then
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# The script that generates the PKI tree already checks if
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# there isn't one, so there's nothing to do here but calling it.
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gen_pki_tree
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fi
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}
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copy_public_key() {
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if [ "${DEY_SOC_VENDOR}" = "NXP" ]; then
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KEY_INDEX="$(expr $TRUSTFENCE_KEY_INDEX + 1)"
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PUBLIC_KEY="${TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH}/crts/key${KEY_INDEX}.pub"
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# The new hab/ahab_pki_tree.sh script extracts the public keys after the PKI
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# generation and leaves them in the crts/ folder. However, the PKI tree may
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# already exist, the PKI generation script not called, and then the public
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# keys may not be available. This is a fall-back to generate at least the
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# selected public key.
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if [ ! -f "${PUBLIC_KEY}" ]; then
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if [ "${TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_MODE}" = "HAB" ]; then
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CERT_IMG="$(echo ${TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH}/crts/IMG${KEY_INDEX}*crt.pem)"
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elif [ "${TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_MODE}" = "AHAB" ]; then
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CERT_IMG="$(echo ${TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH}/crts/SRK${KEY_INDEX}*_ca_crt.pem)"
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else
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bberror "Unknown TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_MODE value"
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exit 1
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fi
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# Extract the public key from the certificate.
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openssl x509 -pubkey -noout -in "${CERT_IMG}" > "${PUBLIC_KEY}"
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fi
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elif [ "${DEY_SOC_VENDOR}" = "STM" ]; then
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if [ "${DIGI_SOM}" = "ccmp15" ]; then
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PUBLIC_KEY="${TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH}/keys/publicKey.pem"
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elif [ "${DIGI_SOM}" = "ccmp13" ]; then
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PUBLIC_KEY="${TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH}/keys/publicKey0${TRUSTFENCE_KEY_INDEX}.pem"
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else
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bberror "Unknown DIGI_SOM"
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exit 1
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fi
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else
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echo "ERROR: Cannot determine the public key"
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exit 1
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fi
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# Copy the public key to the rootfs
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install -d ${IMAGE_ROOTFS}${sysconfdir}/ssl/certs
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cp -f "${PUBLIC_KEY}" "${IMAGE_ROOTFS}${sysconfdir}/ssl/certs/key.pub"
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}
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ROOTFS_POSTPROCESS_COMMAND:append = " copy_public_key;"
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python () {
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import binascii
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import hashlib
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import os
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# Secure console configuration
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_CONSOLE_DISABLE") == "1"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", "CONFIG_CONSOLE_DISABLE=y ")
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if d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_CONSOLE_PASSPHRASE_ENABLE"):
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passphrase_hash = hashlib.sha256(d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_CONSOLE_PASSPHRASE_ENABLE").encode()).hexdigest()
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if (d.getVar("DEY_SOC_VENDOR") == "NXP"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", 'CONFIG_CONSOLE_ENABLE_PASSPHRASE=y CONFIG_CONSOLE_ENABLE_PASSPHRASE_KEY="%s" ' % passphrase_hash)
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elif (d.getVar("DEY_SOC_VENDOR") == "STM"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", 'CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_KEYED=y CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION=y CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENABLE=y CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256="%s" ' % passphrase_hash)
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elif d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_CONSOLE_GPIO_ENABLE"):
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if (d.getVar("DEY_SOC_VENDOR") == "NXP"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", "CONFIG_CONSOLE_ENABLE_GPIO=y CONFIG_CONSOLE_ENABLE_GPIO_NR=%s " % d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_CONSOLE_GPIO_ENABLE"))
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elif (d.getVar("DEY_SOC_VENDOR") == "STM"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", 'CONFIG_CONSOLE_ENABLE_GPIO=y CONFIG_CONSOLE_ENABLE_GPIO_NAME="%s" ' % d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_CONSOLE_GPIO_ENABLE_NAME"))
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# Secure boot configuration
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH") == "default"):
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d.setVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH", d.getVar("TOPDIR") + "/trustfence");
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if (d.getVar("DEY_SOC_VENDOR") == "NXP"):
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_DEK_PATH") == "default"):
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d.setVar("TRUSTFENCE_DEK_PATH", d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH") + "/dek.bin");
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elif (d.getVar("DEY_SOC_VENDOR") == "STM"):
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# Enable authentication capabilities on TF-A independently
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# of whether the images are going to be signed by DEY or externally
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d.setVar("TF_A_SIGN_ENABLE", "1")
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN") == "0"):
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d.setVar("FIP_SIGN_ENABLE", "0")
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN") == "1"):
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# Set STM-specific variables for signing images
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if (d.getVar("DEY_SOC_VENDOR") == "STM"):
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d.setVar("FIP_SIGN_ENABLE", "1")
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d.setVar("FIP_SIGN_KEY_EXTERNAL", "1")
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if (d.getVar("DIGI_SOM") == "ccmp15" ):
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d.setVar("FIP_SIGN_KEY", d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH") + "/keys/privateKey.pem");
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elif (d.getVar("DIGI_SOM") == "ccmp13" ):
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d.setVar("FIP_SIGN_KEY", d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH") + "/keys/privateKey0%s.pem" % d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_KEY_INDEX"));
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d.setVar("TRUSTFENCE_PASSWORD_FILE", d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH") + "/keys/key_pass.txt")
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", "CONFIG_SIGN_IMAGE=y ")
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_ARTIFACTS") == "1"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", "CONFIG_AUTH_ARTIFACTS=y ")
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_READ_ONLY_ROOTFS") == "1"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", "CONFIG_AUTHENTICATE_SQUASHFS_ROOTFS=y ")
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if d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", 'CONFIG_SIGN_KEYS_PATH="%s" ' % d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH"))
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_UNLOCK_KEY_REVOCATION") == "1"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", "CONFIG_UNLOCK_SRK_REVOKE=y ")
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if d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_KEY_INDEX"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", "CONFIG_KEY_INDEX=%s " % d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_KEY_INDEX"))
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if (d.getVar("DEY_SOC_VENDOR") == "NXP"):
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_DEK_PATH") not in [None, "0"]):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", 'CONFIG_DEK_PATH="%s" ' % d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_DEK_PATH"))
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if d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_MODE"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", 'CONFIG_SIGN_MODE="%s" ' % d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_MODE"))
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else:
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# Disable signing artifacts if TRUSTFENCE_SIGN != 1
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d.setVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_ARTIFACTS", "0")
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_ENCRYPT_ENVIRONMENT") == "1"):
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if (d.getVar("DEY_SOC_VENDOR") == "NXP"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", "CONFIG_ENV_AES=y CONFIG_ENV_AES_CAAM_KEY=y ")
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elif (d.getVar("DEY_SOC_VENDOR") == "STM"):
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d.appendVar("UBOOT_TF_CONF", "CONFIG_ENV_AES_CCMP1=y ")
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# Provide sane default values for SWUPDATE class in case Trustfence is enabled
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN") == "1"):
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# Enable package signing.
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d.setVar("SWUPDATE_SIGNING", "RSA")
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# Retrieve the keys path to use.
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keys_path = d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_KEYS_PATH")
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# Retrieve the key index to use.
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key_index = 0
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_KEY_INDEX")):
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key_index = int(d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_KEY_INDEX"))
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key_index_1 = key_index + 1
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# Set the private key template, it will be expanded later in 'swu' recipes once keys are generated.
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if (d.getVar("DEY_SOC_VENDOR") == "NXP"):
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_SIGN_MODE", "") == "AHAB"):
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d.setVar("SWUPDATE_PRIVATE_KEY_TEMPLATE", keys_path + "/keys/SRK" + str(key_index_1) + "*key.pem")
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d.setVar("CONFIG_SIGN_MODE", "AHAB")
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else:
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d.setVar("SWUPDATE_PRIVATE_KEY_TEMPLATE", keys_path + "/keys/IMG" + str(key_index_1) + "*key.pem")
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d.setVar("CONFIG_SIGN_MODE", "HAB")
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# Set the key password.
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d.setVar("SWUPDATE_PASSWORD_FILE", keys_path + "/keys/key_pass.txt")
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# Enable partition encryption if rootfs encryption is enabled
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_ENCRYPT_ROOTFS") == "1"):
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d.setVar("TRUSTFENCE_ENCRYPT_PARTITIONS", "1");
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# Enable the trustfence initramfs if and only if partition encryption is enabled
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# and not using a read-only rootfs
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if (d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_ENCRYPT_PARTITIONS") == "1" and \
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d.getVar("STORAGE_MEDIA") == "mmc" and \
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d.getVar("TRUSTFENCE_READ_ONLY_ROOTFS") == "0"):
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d.setVar("TRUSTFENCE_INITRAMFS_IMAGE", "dey-image-trustfence-initramfs");
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else:
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d.setVar("TRUSTFENCE_INITRAMFS_IMAGE", "");
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}
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